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State of MCP Security 2026 — Prevalence & Score Calibration

We scanned 2,303 distinct public MCP server configs with an offline static scanner. More than 1 in 2 declares a remote server with no authentication, more than half ship a critical-severity flaw, the median config scores a B, and the top 10% score an A.

Reproducible data report (empirical companion to the State-of-MCP-Security report, issue #23). Every "measured" number below comes from running AgentAuditKit (fully offline, deterministic, Apache-2.0; the exact ruleset is the committed rules.json bundle at this repo's HEAD) over a content-deduplicated corpus of public MCP configs, and is the figure of report version 1.3. Raw aggregate: results.json. External figures are attributed to their sources, not measured by us.

On the corpus. Two provenance-tracked sources — a GitHub Code Search crawl of public MCP config files and the official MCP Registry's latest-version servers — deduplicated by file content: 2,303 distinct configs. This is the same corpus REPORT.md documents; the split and provenance are in the Methodology section below. We report the real N — 2,303 — not a round target.


Three headline numbers

  1. 50.6% (1,166/2,303) of public MCP configs declare a remote server with no authentication — a critical-severity posture (AAK-MCP-001) and the single most common finding in the corpus. It corroborates Knostic's 119-of-119 unauthenticated tool-listing finding from the deployment side.
  2. 51.5% (1,185/2,303) contain at least one critical-severity finding — driven almost entirely by that no-auth remote-server class.
  3. The median public MCP config scores a B; the top 10% score an A. (This is the empirical score-calibration anchor issue #23 asked for. The roadmap guessed "median C-, top 10% B+" — the real distribution skews higher, because most configs carry one dominant critical posture rather than a long tail of findings.)

Score distribution (A–F) — the calibration

Grade Configs Share Cumulative
A 787 34.2% 34.2%
B 1,281 55.6% 89.8%
C 96 4.2% 94.0%
D 52 2.3% 96.2%
F 87 3.8% 100%
  • Median grade: B, the grade of config 1,152 of 2,303 ranked best first (cumulative A = 787, A+B = 2,068).
  • Top 10% (the best 230 configs): none below A (A alone holds 787).
  • 6.0% (139) land at D or F.

The grade is AAK's penalty-based score (start at 100; deduct 20/CRITICAL, 10/HIGH, 5/MEDIUM, 2/LOW), identical to aak score. **Calibration takeaway for

23:** the current penalties produce a sane spread — a clear A/B mode with a real

D/F tail — and the median lands at B, not the "C-" the roadmap assumed. What moved the story since the earlier crawl-only corpus is not the penalty weights but the corpus: adding the MCP Registry surfaced how dominant the no-auth remote-server posture is. No penalty re-weighting is done in this report (that's a follow-up).


Severity + category prevalence

All findings: 1,293 critical · 208 high · 4,936 medium · 652 low. Per-config: 51.5% have ≥1 critical; 4.8% have ≥1 high.

AAK category Configs with ≥1 finding Share
MCP Configuration 2,300 99.9%
Supply Chain 288 12.5%
Transport Security 53 2.3%
Legal Compliance 8 0.3%
Secret Exposure 4 0.2%
Composition 1 0.0%
Tool Poisoning 1 0.0%

OWASP MCP Top 10 — configs tripping each risk

Each rule carries the OWASP MCP Top 10 ids (v0.1, the 2025 edition) of the risks it detects, under the titles OWASP gives them. A config trips a risk when one of its findings carries the id; the two advisory-posture rules below are left out, as in the top-ten table. Before report version 1.1 this table used AAK's own labels for the ids, in a different order, so the two do not compare row for row.

OWASP MCP Top 10 Risk Configs Share
MCP07:2025 Insufficient Authentication & Authorization 1,595 69.3%
MCP01:2025 Token Mismanagement & Secret Exposure 455 19.8%
MCP04:2025 Software Supply Chain Attacks & Dependency Tampering 453 19.7%
MCP05:2025 Command Injection & Execution 213 9.2%
MCP02:2025 Privilege Escalation via Scope Creep 20 0.9%
MCP09:2025 Shadow MCP Servers 3 0.1%
MCP10:2025 Context Injection & Over-Sharing 2 0.1%
MCP03:2025 Tool Poisoning 1 0.0%

Top 10 most-common findings (advisory-posture rules excluded)

# Rule Finding Severity Configs Share
1 AAK-MCP-001 Remote MCP server without authentication CRITICAL 1,166 50.6%
2 AAK-MCP-005 MCP server uses npx/uvx to fetch and execute remote packages MEDIUM 450 19.5%
3 AAK-OAUTH-008 MCP OAuth surface with no RFC 9728 Protected Resource Metadata discovery LOW 424 18.4%
4 AAK-SUPPLY-001 MCP server package not pinned to exact version MEDIUM 284 12.3%
5 AAK-MCP-006 MCP server command uses relative path MEDIUM 179 7.8%
6 AAK-MCP-STDIO-LAUNCHER-INJECT-001 MCP stdio server launches a shell-style interpreter with an exec flag or interpolated args HIGH 49 2.1%
7 AAK-TRANSPORT-003 Deprecated SSE transport in use MEDIUM 47 2.0%
8 AAK-MCP-003 MCP server environment exposes secrets HIGH 30 1.3%
9 AAK-MCP-SERENA-CVE-2026-49471-001 Serena MCP toolkit below 1.5.2 (unauthenticated dashboard → DNS-rebinding RCE) HIGH 19 0.8%
10 AAK-MCP-004 Excessive number of MCP servers declared HIGH 12 0.5%

Two advisory-posture rules are excluded so the story isn't inflated (tracked in results.json under excluded_advisory_rules): AAK-MCP-ATTEST-001 (deny-by-default attestation — fires on ~every server) and AAK-MCP-007 (no version pin in args, LOW). The two fixes that matter, in order: authenticate remote servers (50.6% declare one with no auth) and pin what you launch (12.3% launch a package with no pinned version, and 19.5% fetch and execute one through npx/uvx at launch).


Methodology

  • Corpus. MCP config files from two provenance-tracked sources — a GitHub Code Search crawl across five filename queries (.mcp.json, mcp.json, claude_desktop_config.json, cline_mcp_settings.json, mcp_settings.json) and the official MCP Registry's latest-version servers — deduplicated by repo+path at crawl time and again by file content at scan time.

In-corpus split: 664 crawled + 1,639 registry = 2,303 distinct, from 2,389 candidates (85 byte-identical duplicates + 1 unparseable removed). - Registry configs. Each registry server becomes one scannable config: its remote endpoint with the names of the headers it declares, or its package launched at the version the registry record states (npx -y <package>@<version>, uvx <package>@<version>). - Scanner. AgentAuditKit, offline and deterministic — no cloud, LLM, or telemetry. Each config is written alone as .mcp.json, the name every scanner reads, and scanned via the same run_scan + compute_score the CLI and MCP Security Index use. Deterministic: same corpus → byte-identical results.json. - Public metadata only. We scan committed configuration files and public registry metadata. No live server probing, no exploitation, no credential use. Rate-limited crawl, respects GitHub API limits.

Reproducibility

  • Ruleset: the committed, Sigstore-signable rules.json bundle at this repo's HEAD.
  • Corpus: regenerate results.json from the committed manifest, offline and deterministically. We deliberately do not publish a per-server list mapping repos to grades/findings — that would de-anonymize specific servers, against the repo's 90-day coordinated-disclosure policy. The report is aggregate-only.
git clone https://github.com/sattyamjjain/agent-audit-kit && cd agent-audit-kit
pip install -e .
make report          # refreshes results.json from the committed manifest, offline + deterministic
# refreshing the corpus itself (the one network step) is separate:
python research/state-of-mcp-2026/fetch_registry.py --target 5000

At the published run the registry walk collected 1,641 distinct latest-version servers (corpus/registry-manifest.json → distinct_latest_servers, fetched_at 2026-07-26). --target 5000 is deliberately larger than that so the walk runs to cursor-exhaustion rather than stopping early; the MCP Registry grows over time, so a later rerun that returns a larger N is registry growth, not a broken command.

Scan your own in 30s, fully offline: pip install agent-audit-kit && agent-audit-kit scan .


Limitations (read before quoting)

  1. Public-metadata static scan, not runtime. A matched pattern is not proof of exploitability in context; a clean scan is not proof of safety. Auth posture is inferred from declared config, not a live probe.
  2. N of unreachable servers. Downloads fail for private/deleted repos and rate-limited fetches; those are dropped, so 2,303 is "distinct public configs we could fetch and parse," not "all MCP servers."
  3. Sample skews to discoverable public repos + registry latest-version entries (Code Search ranks by relevance + stars; the registry crawl is a 40-page snapshot). Not a uniform random sample of all registered servers.
  4. External figures are as-reported by the cited third parties (Knostic 1,862 exposed / 119-of-119 unauthenticated; the 2,614-server 82%-path-traversal survey). Only the 2,303-config scan is ours.
  5. No CVEs/advisories were filed for this report. A static match on a committed config is not live-exploitation proof, and disclosing a specific server is a deliberate, per-maintainer coordinated-disclosure decision — not something to automate off an aggregate scan. Genuine exposures surface through the MCP Security Index under the 90-day policy.

Distribution

Ready-to-post launch copy lives in one place — docs/DISTRIBUTION-CHECKLIST.md — and every quantitative token there is substituted from results.json. This report is the data; the checklist is the copy. Nothing here or there auto-posts.