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AAK-AGENT-COMPOSE-002: Tool-call arguments spliced across a session reconstruct a denied file path or URL

Severity
MEDIUM
Category
Trust Boundaries (trust-boundary)
Scanner
agent_audit_kit/scanners/session_splice.py
Auto-fixable
No.
SARIF name
SessionSpliceReassembledDeniedTarget

What it detects

Where AAK-AGENT-COMPOSE-001 unions capability across a set of skills, this rule reads an ordered transcript of tool calls in one session and flags when the concatenation of arguments across consecutive same-tool calls reconstructs a sensitive file path (e.g. .ssh/id_rsa, .env, .aws/credentials) or a URL to a non-allowlisted host that no single call would have been allowed to request. Each call is individually compliant; the intent exists only after fragmentation. This is the GhostSplice / cross-channel trust-fragmentation attack disclosed by the ASSET Research Group (https://asset-group.github.io/disclosures/ghostsplice/): a malicious MCP server splits one refused request across several channels the agent already trusts. Scope is deliberately narrow: file-path and URL reassembly only, not general intent detection. It was written from the public disclosure, not from a reproduction AAK ran. Reuses AAK-AGENT-COMPOSE-001's config (.aak/composition-boundaries.yaml: session_reassembly.sensitive_path_patterns and the shared egress_allowlist).

How to fix

Deny on the reassembled value, not just per-call arguments: normalise and re-check the full path or URL at the point of file read or network egress, and pin egress to an allowlist. Review the flagged session for whether the fragmentation was legitimate chunked work or an actual splice.

To confirm the finding is gone, report only this rule:

agent-audit-kit scan . --rules AAK-AGENT-COMPOSE-002

Limitations

Defaults to a warning (MEDIUM), not a failure, because it WILL produce false positives on legitimate chunked work: a large file uploaded or written in path-sized pieces, or a URL built from templated fragments, reassembles the same way an attack does. It only sees file-path and URL reassembly across consecutive same-tool calls; a splice across different tools, or intent that is not a path or URL, is out of scope. Treat a finding as a prompt to look, not a verdict. A URL that Node, requests and Rust's url crate read differently from curl, httpx and urlsplit, which keep a backslash inside the authority, is judged by the less safe of the two readings.

References


All rules. This page is generated from the rule registry when the documentation is built; to change it, change the rule in agent_audit_kit/rules/builtin.py. To give the rule a hand-written write-up, add docs/rules/AAK-AGENT-COMPOSE-002.md: the page then shows that text, with the registry reference appended under it.