AAK-AZURE-MCP-NOAUTH-001
Azure MCP server published without auth middleware on /mcp/* routes
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Severity | HIGH |
| Category | MCP_CONFIG |
| Shipped | v0.3.6 |
| Scanner | agent_audit_kit/scanners/mcp_server_auth.py |
| CWE | CWE-306 |
| OWASP MCP | MCP07:2025 (Insufficient Authentication & Authorization) |
| OWASP Agentic | ASI03 (Identity and Privilege Abuse) |
| AICM | IAM-01, IAM-16 |
| CVE | CVE-2026-32211 (CVSS 9.1) |
| Sister rule | AAK-AZURE-MCP-001 (consumer-side) |
What it catches
Repository publishes an Azure-MCP-shaped server (@azure/mcp-server,
azure-mcp-server Python package, or mcp-server-azure keywords in
pyproject.toml / package.json) and exposes one or more /mcp/*
route handlers (FastAPI / Flask / Express / Fastify / Hono) without an
auth marker (@require_auth, verify_jwt, DefaultAzureCredential,
Authorization header check, mTLS, passport.authenticate,
bearerStrategy) anywhere in the same file.
Why a sister rule
v0.3.5's AAK-AZURE-MCP-001 detects the consumer side: agents whose
.mcp.json points at an Azure MCP endpoint without auth. This rule is
the upstream pair so server authors ship secure defaults.
Remediation
Add an auth middleware to every /mcp/* route:
from fastapi import FastAPI, Header
app = FastAPI()
@app.post("/mcp/tools/run")
async def run_tool(payload: dict, Authorization: str = Header(...)) -> dict:
verify_jwt(Authorization)
return {"ok": True, "result": payload}
Reject unauthenticated requests with HTTP 401 before dispatching to the MCP handler. Prefer Azure-AD managed identities or workload identity federation over static API keys.
Registry reference
This section is generated from the rule registry (agent_audit_kit/rules/builtin.py) when the documentation is built, so it follows the scanner. The rest of the page is hand-written; where the two disagree, the registry is what runs.
- Severity
- HIGH
- Category
- MCP Configuration (
mcp-config) - Scanner
agent_audit_kit/scanners/mcp_server_auth.py- Auto-fixable
- No.
- SARIF name
AzureMcpServerNoAuth
What it detects
Repository publishes an Azure-MCP-shaped server (@azure/mcp-server, azure-mcp-server Python package, or mcp-server-azure keywords in pyproject.toml / package.json) and exposes one or more /mcp/* route handlers without an auth middleware on the same route. CVE-2026-32211 (CVSS 9.1) is the server-side default that AAK-AZURE-MCP-001 catches on the consumer side; this rule is the upstream pair so server authors ship secure defaults.
How to fix
Add an auth middleware to every /mcp/* route — Azure-AD JWT validation, client_credentials, mTLS, or a vault-issued API key checked at request time. Reject unauthenticated requests with HTTP 401 before dispatching to the MCP handler.
To confirm the finding is gone, report only this rule:
agent-audit-kit scan . --rules AAK-AZURE-MCP-NOAUTH-001
Limitations
Runs only when the root pyproject.toml, package.json, Cargo.toml or pom.xml contains @azure/mcp-server, mcp-server-azure, mcp.azurewebsites.net or azure, mcp and server joined by -, _ or nothing (azure-mcp-server, azure_mcp_server, azuremcpserver), in any case. It then looks for /mcp routes, written as @app, @router or @api decorators in Python and as app, router, server, api or fastify calls such as app.post(...) in TypeScript and JavaScript, and skips any file that contains an auth marker anywhere. DefaultAzureCredential is such a marker, so a server that only uses its own credential to call Azure, and authenticates nobody who calls it, passes, and so does a route on an object with another name, such as a Flask blueprint called bp. A source file over 512 KB, or a manifest over 2 MB, is not read.
References
- CVE: CVE-2026-32211
- OWASP MCP Top 10: MCP07:2025 (Insufficient Authentication & Authorization)
- OWASP Agentic Top 10: ASI03 (Identity and Privilege Abuse)
- Adversa AI MCP Top 25 (AAK-defined ids): ADV-AUTH-02
- Incidents and advisories: MSRC-2026-04-03-AZUREMCP
- CSA AI Controls Matrix (AICM): IAM-01, IAM-16