AAK-MALICIOUS-EXTENSION-001
An agent host's installed editor extension is a build listed as malware
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Severity | CRITICAL |
| Category | SUPPLY_CHAIN |
| Shipped | v0.6.31 |
| Scanner | agent_audit_kit/scanners/malicious_extensions.py |
| Feed | the extensions list of agent_audit_kit/data/malicious_releases.json, read by agent_audit_kit/malicious_feed.py |
| OWASP Agentic | ASI04 (Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities), ASI05 (Unexpected Code Execution) |
| Incident | Claude Code extension on Cursor's marketplace, 29 Oct 2026 (Cursor's notice) |
An editor extension is not an MCP surface, so the rule carries no OWASP MCP id.
Why it exists
On 29 Oct 2026, from about 09:27 to 20:35 UTC, Cursor's extension marketplace
served tampered builds of Anthropic's Claude Code extension,
anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 and 2.1.313, under Anthropic's own publisher
id. Cursor's notice says the tampered extension.js added an SSH key labelled
svc-telemetry to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, tried to open a reverse SSH
tunnel, and installed a LaunchAgent on macOS, a crontab line on Linux or a
scheduled task on Windows, and that at most 5,000 users installed it.
AAK read MCP configs under .vscode/ and had no notion of the extensions an
editor installs, so a home directory, a dev container or an image that carried
the build scanned clean.
What it catches
VS Code and the editors built on it install an extension into
<home>/.<editor>/extensions/<publisher>.<name>-<version>[-<platform>]/ and
list the installs in an extensions.json index beside the folders. That is
VS Code's own folder key (ExtensionKey) and profile index, and Cursor's
remediation script reads the same layout
(~/.*/extensions/anthropic.claude-code-*/extension.js). The rule reports:
- an extension folder whose
publisher.nameand version a feed entry lists, for the editors the entry names. A platform suffix is read as one (anthropic.claude-code-2.1.313-darwin-arm64is 2.1.313 for darwin-arm64); - a folder of any version whose file the entry names has a SHA-256 the entry lists. A tampered build can carry the number of a real release, and Cursor's script says as much: "The tampered bundle keeps the real version number, so match on content";
- an
extensions.jsonindex entry whose id and version an entry lists, when its folder is gone, reported once per id and version; - a workspace's
.vscode/extensions.jsonrecommending an id an entry lists in every version. A recommendation names no version, so an entry that lists particular versions is not reported for it.
Where it looks
| Scan | Homes read |
|---|---|
any aak scan PATH |
PATH itself (a home directory, a dev container home), PATH/root/, and each PATH/home/*/ and PATH/Users/*/ (an unpacked image root filesystem) |
with --include-user-config |
also this user's own home, so ~/.cursor/extensions and ~/.vscode/extensions |
In each home, every dot folder with an extensions directory is an editor,
named by its folder: .cursor is cursor, .vscode is vscode,
.vscode-insiders is vscode-insiders, and a remote server's copy
(.cursor-server, .vscode-server) is the editor's own. A feed entry names
the editors it covers, or every editor with *.
The bundled entry
| Field | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
extension |
anthropic.claude-code |
Cursor's notice |
versions |
2.1.313 |
Cursor's notice; Anthropic never published a 2.1.313 (npm @anthropic-ai/claude-code, the VS Code Marketplace and Open VSX all go from 2.1.312 to 2.1.314, read 1 Nov 2026) |
hosts |
* |
no legitimate 2.1.313 exists on any marketplace, so a 2.1.313 in any editor is the tampered build |
sha256 |
extension.js: ecb58cb29078d9646ad1dcdbe51526f2d9cfea06be5fb2ab183e8ecc3ab6bf15 |
Cursor's notice, the tampered extension.js of 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 on macOS and Windows |
fixed |
2.1.314 |
the next release on the VS Code Marketplace and Open VSX |
2.1.312 is a real release (Anthropic published it on 27 Oct), so it is not
listed by version: a 2.1.312 is reported only when its extension.js has the
digest above. The entry's note carries the persistence Cursor names, and every
finding quotes it.
What it does not see
- A home elsewhere, such as
srv/<user>/, an extensions folder moved by--extensions-dirorVSCODE_EXTENSIONS, and a portable install. - A symlinked extension folder, and the index of a profile other than the default.
- An uninstalled
.vsix, a devcontainer.jsonextensionslist, and an editor's download cache. - A file over 64 MiB is not hashed, and an index entry whose folder is gone is matched on its version alone.
- Whether the build ran or what it left behind: a finding says the build is on disk. Check the persistence the finding names.
- Neither OSV nor GitHub lists editor extensions, so
aak updatekeeps the bundled entry and adds none. An index over 8 MB is not read.
How to fix
Remove the extension, then install the publisher's fixed release from a
marketplace the advisory clears (for anthropic.claude-code, 2.1.314 or later
from the VS Code Marketplace or Open VSX). Check the machine for the
persistence the advisory names, which removing the extension does not undo: for
the Claude Code builds, a svc-telemetry key in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys,
~/.config/.smt and .smtk, the LaunchAgent com.apple.sysmond, a crontab
@reboot line and the scheduled task SysMon. Where any is present, isolate
the machine and rotate every credential it could reach.
A finding reads:
`.cursor/extensions/anthropic.claude-code-2.1.313` is an installed anthropic.claude-code
2.1.313 for cursor, and CURSOR-CLAUDE-CODE-2026-10-29 lists anthropic.claude-code 2.1.313
as malicious (https://cursor.com/blog/claude-code-extension-security-notice). Remove the
extension, update to 2.1.314 or later, and check the machine for the persistence the
advisory names; removing the extension may not remove it. Cursor's notice (read 2026-11-01)
names 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 ... An install says the build was on disk, not whether it ran.
Feed: the bundled copy generated ...
Registry reference
This section is generated from the rule registry (agent_audit_kit/rules/builtin.py) when the documentation is built, so it follows the scanner. The rest of the page is hand-written; where the two disagree, the registry is what runs.
- Severity
- CRITICAL
- Category
- Supply Chain (
supply-chain) - Scanner
agent_audit_kit/scanners/malicious_extensions.py- Auto-fixable
- No.
- SARIF name
KnownMaliciousEditorExtension
What it detects
An editor that hosts coding agents (Cursor, VS Code and the editors built on it) has installed an extension build that the offline malicious-release feed lists: a version no legitimate publisher shipped, or a build whose file matches a published SHA-256. On 29 Oct 2026 Cursor's extension marketplace served tampered builds of Anthropic's Claude Code extension, anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 and 2.1.313, under Anthropic's publisher id for about eleven hours; their extension.js added an SSH key to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys and installed a LaunchAgent, a scheduled task or a crontab line (Cursor's notice). AAK read MCP configs under .vscode/ and no extension folder, so a home directory, dev container or image that carried the build scanned clean. The rule reads the installed folders and their extensions.json index; a tampered build can carry the number of a real release, as 2.1.312 did, and is then matched by content.
How to fix (registry)
Remove the extension, then install the publisher's fixed release from a marketplace the advisory clears (for anthropic.claude-code, 2.1.314 or later from the VS Code Marketplace or Open VSX). Check the machine for the persistence the advisory names, which removing the extension does not undo: for the Claude Code builds, an SSH key labelled svc-telemetry in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, ~/.config/.smt and .smtk, the LaunchAgent com.apple.sysmond, a crontab @reboot line and the scheduled task SysMon. Where any is present, isolate the machine and rotate every credential it could reach.
To confirm the finding is gone, report only this rule:
agent-audit-kit scan . --rules AAK-MALICIOUS-EXTENSION-001
Limitations
Reads the folders a VS Code-based editor installs extensions into, <home>/.<editor>/extensions/<publisher>.<name>-<version>[-<platform>]/, and the extensions.json index beside them, in the scan root itself, root/, and each home/*/ and Users/*/ below it; with --include-user-config also in this user's home. An editor is named by its data folder (.cursor is cursor, .vscode is vscode, a remote server's .cursor-server or .vscode-server is the editor's own), and a feed entry matches only the editors it names, or every one for *. A home elsewhere (srv/<user>/), a folder moved by --extensions-dir or VSCODE_EXTENSIONS, a portable install, a symlinked extension folder and the index of a profile other than the default are not read. A version matches exactly as the folder name or index writes it; a digest is computed only for the file an entry names, inside the folder and up to 64 MiB, so an index entry whose folder is gone is matched on its version alone. A workspace's .vscode/extensions.json recommendations name no version and are reported only for an entry that lists every version. An uninstalled .vsix, a devcontainer.json extensions list and an editor's download cache are not read. The rule says a listed build is on disk, not whether it ran or what it left behind. The bundled feed lists one extension entry, anthropic.claude-code: 2.1.313 on every editor, and any build whose extension.js has the SHA-256 Cursor published for the tampered 2.1.312 and 2.1.313; aak update keeps it and adds none, since neither OSV nor GitHub lists editor extensions. An index over 8 MB is not read.
References
- OWASP Agentic Top 10: ASI04 (Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities), ASI05 (Unexpected Code Execution (RCE))
- Incidents and advisories: CURSOR-CLAUDE-CODE-2026-10-29
- CSA AI Controls Matrix (AICM): STA-08, IVS-04