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AAK-MALICIOUS-RELEASE-001

A declared, locked, installed or deployed release is listed as malware

Field Value
Severity CRITICAL
Category SUPPLY_CHAIN
Shipped v0.6.28
Scanner agent_audit_kit/scanners/malicious_releases.py
OWASP MCP MCP04:2025 (Software Supply Chain Attacks & Dependency Tampering)
OWASP Agentic ASI04 (Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities), ASI05 (Unexpected Code Execution)
Incident litellm 1.107.0, 21 Oct 2026 (OSV MAL-2026-2144, LiteLLM's post); the ARTEX AI images on Docker Hub, 5 Nov 2026 (The Hacker News)

What it catches

A release that a source has published as malware, wherever the project names it:

  • a declaration that pins it: litellm==1.107.0 in requirements.txt, an exact version in pyproject.toml, Pipfile or package.json, or a launch such as uvx litellm==1.107.0 or npx -y pkg@1.2.3 in an MCP config;
  • a lockfile that resolves it: uv.lock, poetry.lock, Pipfile.lock, package-lock.json, npm-shrinkwrap.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock (v1), Cargo.lock, and a go.mod's require lines (go.sum is not read, and a Cargo.toml without its Cargo.lock resolves nothing). A Cargo.lock holding
[[package]]
name = "env-test-guard"
version = "0.3.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"

is reported at its [[package]] line, and so is the same crate spelled env_test_guard: cargo treats - and _ in a crate name alike; - an installed litellm-1.107.0.dist-info in a site-packages directory, a project's .venv and an unpacked image root filesystem included; - an image reference by digest, such as litellm/litellm@sha256:1bbcb1443bc962e45f5aad53fe3d2c30600e0379715fb6c664cdd3ac126c339e, in a Dockerfile, a compose or Kubernetes file, or an MCP config; - any reference to a repository the feed lists whole, because an attacker owns it and every build is the payload: image: tomicdd/artex:latest in a compose or Kubernetes file, a Helm repository: with its tag:, or FROM docker.io/tomicdd/artex, by any tag, by digest or bare; - with aak scan --include-user-config, a release a launcher fetched onto this host: a package in npm's npx cache (<npm cache>/_npx/<hash>/node_modules/<name>/package.json) or a <name>-<version>.dist-info in one of uv's tool environments (<uv cache>/environments-v*/, where uvx runs a tool). The evidence reads npx cache at <path> holds <name> <version>. Without the flag a scan reads nothing outside the project.

An MCP config that launches a listed package with no version (npx -y local-commander-agent) is AAK-MALICIOUS-RELEASE-002: nothing says which release it installed, so this rule cannot report it.

A version pin cannot catch this. litellm 1.107.0 sat above every pinned floor while it ran a credential stealer at every Python start.

The feed

A scan reads ~/.agent-audit-kit/malicious_releases.json when aak update has written it, else the copy bundled with AAK, and never touches the network. The SARIF run's properties.dataFeeds and the console summary say which copy was read and when it was generated.

  • The bundled copy lists OSV MAL-2026-2144 (litellm 1.82.7, 1.82.8 and 1.107.0), OSV MAL-2026-18425 (local-commander-agent 0.3.52, GHSA-7j62-5j84-72fv), OSV MAL-2026-2307 (axios 0.30.4 and 1.14.1, GHSA-fw8c-xr5c-95f9), OSV MAL-2026-2306 (every release of plain-crypto-js, GHSA-2x9r-6wxq-hrr7), OSV MAL-2026-18776 (the crate env-test-guard 0.2.0 and 0.3.0, which GitHub lists as GHSA-7w47-jmjx-gvm2: its GitEnv::detect() sends CI tokens out from a runner) and the image index digest from LiteLLM's incident post. That post names the Docker Hub tags without the repository; docker.io/litellm/litellm carries them. Its GHCR digests are truncated, so none is listed.
  • It also lists docker.io/tomicdd/artex and docker.io/congdonglinux/artex whole. The Hacker News reported on 5 Nov 2026 that both carry a hidden verifyCaptcha() in the ARTEX AI console's login handler that runs part of the CAPTCHA field through sh -c as root before any credential check, and named no tag or digest. The six other namespaces it names as publishing an artex image are not called backdoored and are not listed.
  • aak update rebuilds the cached copy from OSV's exports for PyPI, npm, crates.io and Go (about 280 MB), keeping only MAL- records, the OpenSSF Malicious Packages data: 11,960 PyPI and 222,857 npm records on 2026-10-28, and 21 crates.io and 20 Go records on 2026-11-07, withdrawn ones dropped. The advisory feed AAK-KNOWN-VULN-001 reads comes out of the same downloads.
  • aak update --github-malware, with GITHUB_TOKEN or GH_TOKEN set, also reads GitHub's malware advisories for npm, pip, rust and go: 109,402 for npm and 11,915 for pip on 2026-10-28, about 1,200 API requests. A failed update keeps the cached copy as it was and exits non-zero.

How a version matches

  • Exactly: PEP 440 normalised for PyPI (1.107 is 1.107.0), as written for npm and crates.io, and without its leading v for Go (v0.3.0 is 0.3.0). litellm==1.107.0rc1 is not reported; OSV says the release candidates were clean.
  • A range, or a declaration with no version, matches only an entry that lists every release of a package (most typosquats). A range does not say which release was installed.
  • An image tag never matches a digest entry, only a digest, and a digest matches whatever registry name the reference gives it.
  • A whole-repository entry matches its repository by any tag, by digest or bare, with Docker Hub spelt docker.io/, index.docker.io/, registry-1.docker.io/ or not at all, and only in an image slot. It does not match the same path on another registry (ghcr.io/tomicdd/artex), a longer name (tomicdd/artex-pro), a docker run argument, or the name in a comment or in prose.
  • npm's 0.0.1-security placeholder, which replaces a removed package, never matches.

How to fix

Pin a version the feed does not list (for axios 1.14.1 or 0.30.4, 1.14.0 or 0.30.3, and delete node_modules/plain-crypto-js, as the axios postmortem advises; for litellm, 1.106.2, the version LiteLLM named), re-lock, and rebuild the environment or image from scratch. Treat every environment, host or cluster that installed or ran the release as compromised: rotate each credential it could reach and review its outbound traffic.


Registry reference

This section is generated from the rule registry (agent_audit_kit/rules/builtin.py) when the documentation is built, so it follows the scanner. The rest of the page is hand-written; where the two disagree, the registry is what runs.

Severity
CRITICAL
Category
Supply Chain (supply-chain)
Scanner
agent_audit_kit/scanners/malicious_releases.py
Auto-fixable
No.
SARIF name
KnownMaliciousRelease

What it detects

A manifest pins, a lockfile resolves, a site-packages directory has installed, a launcher's cache on this host holds (with --include-user-config), or an image reference by digest runs a release that the offline malicious-release feed lists, or an image reference names a repository the feed lists whole: OSV's OpenSSF Malicious Packages (MAL-) records for PyPI, npm, crates.io and Go, GitHub's malware advisories when aak update could read them, image digests from vendor incident reports, and image repositories that exist only to ship a payload, such as the backdoored ARTEX AI images on Docker Hub (The Hacker News, 5 Nov 2026), whose report names no tag or digest. Such a release is malware rather than a flaw below a fix, so no version pin catches it: litellm 1.107.0 (21 Oct 2026, OSV MAL-2026-2144) sat above every pinned floor and ran a credential stealer at every Python start. A scan reads the feed aak update caches at ~/.agent-audit-kit/malicious_releases.json, else the copy bundled with AAK, and never touches the network; the SARIF run and the console summary name the copy and when it was generated.

How to fix (registry)

Remove the release: pin a version the feed does not list (for litellm, 1.106.2, the version LiteLLM named; for axios 1.14.1 or 0.30.4, 1.14.0 or 0.30.3, and delete node_modules/plain-crypto-js, as the axios postmortem advises), re-lock, and rebuild the environment or image from scratch rather than upgrading in place. Treat every environment, host or cluster that installed or ran it as compromised: rotate each credential it could reach and review its outbound traffic. Run aak update to refresh the feed.

To confirm the finding is gone, report only this rule:

agent-audit-kit scan . --rules AAK-MALICIOUS-RELEASE-001

Limitations

Reads, anywhere outside AAK's skip directories, requirements*.txt, pyproject.toml, Pipfile, package.json (not its scripts) and the launches in MCP configs (.mcp.json, mcp.json, claude_desktop_config.json, *.mcp.json, *.mcp.yaml, *.mcp.yml) for a declaration that pins one version; the lockfiles uv.lock, poetry.lock, Pipfile.lock, package-lock.json, npm-shrinkwrap.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock (v1) and Cargo.lock for resolved versions, and go.mod for the module versions its require lines name, as AAK-KNOWN-VULN-001 reads them (go.sum is not read, and a Cargo.toml without its Cargo.lock resolves nothing); <name>-<version>.dist-info directories in the site-packages and dist-packages directories AAK-STARTUP-HOOK-PTH-001's walk reaches; @sha256: image references in Dockerfiles, YAML files and MCP configs; and, for a whole-repository entry, references to its repository in an image slot of a Dockerfile or YAML file: an image: value, a Helm repository: paired with a tag:, or the image of a FROM line. With --include-user-config it also reads this host's npx cache (<npm cache>/_npx/*/node_modules/<name>/package.json, the cache an npm_config_cache variable names, else ~/.npm or %LocalAppData%\npm-cache) and uv's tool environments (the <name>-<version>.dist-info directories under <uv cache>/environments-v*/, the cache UV_CACHE_DIR names, else $XDG_CACHE_HOME/uv, ~/.cache/uv or %LOCALAPPDATA%\uv\cache); an .npmrc cache= line, uv's --cache-dir and tool.uv.cache-dir, uv tool install environments and the pnpm, yarn and bun caches are not read, and without the flag no cache is. A version matches exactly, PEP 440 normalised for PyPI, as written for npm and crates.io and without its leading v for Go, so a pre-release beside a malicious release (litellm 1.107.0rc1) is not reported, and npm's 0.0.1-security placeholder never matches. A range, or a declaration without a version, matches only an entry that lists every release of the package, since a range does not say which release was installed. An image tag never matches a digest entry, only a digest, and a digest matches whatever registry name the reference gives it. A whole-repository entry matches its repository by any tag, by digest or bare, with Docker Hub spelt docker.io/, index.docker.io/, registry-1.docker.io/ or not at all, but not the same path on another registry, and not a name in a docker run argument (an MCP config's, a script's or a workflow step's), a workflow's container: shorthand, a Helm repository: with no tag: beside it, or a reference whose registry is a template (${REGISTRY}/...). A program an MCP config runs by name names no registry and is not read, nor are .egg-info installs, node_modules, conda metadata or an image's registry layers. The bundled feed lists only MAL-2026-2144 (litellm 1.82.7, 1.82.8 and 1.107.0), MAL-2026-18425 (local-commander-agent 0.3.52), MAL-2026-2307 (axios 0.30.4 and 1.14.1), MAL-2026-2306 (every release of plain-crypto-js), MAL-2026-18776 (the crate env-test-guard 0.2.0 and 0.3.0), one image index digest and two whole repositories (docker.io/tomicdd/artex and docker.io/congdonglinux/artex), so without aak update nothing else is known. A lockfile that resolves one release more than once is reported once, at its first entry, and an image reference is quoted from at most 256 characters before its digest or repository name, and a repository reference that starts further back is not read. A manifest over 2 MB, a lockfile over 32 MiB or an image-reference file over 2 MB is not read.

References

  • OWASP MCP Top 10: MCP04:2025 (Software Supply Chain Attacks & Dependency Tampering)
  • OWASP Agentic Top 10: ASI04 (Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities), ASI05 (Unexpected Code Execution (RCE))
  • Adversa AI MCP Top 25 (AAK-defined ids): ADV-SUPPLY-04 (Known Vulnerable Dep)
  • Incidents and advisories: BERRIAI-LITELLM-2026-10-21, MAL-2026-18776, ARTEX-AI-DOCKER-2026-11-05
  • CSA AI Controls Matrix (AICM): STA-08

All rules.