AAK-MCP-AUTH-PATHTRAVERSAL-001
MCP bearer-token joined into a session file path (path traversal)
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Severity | CRITICAL |
| Category | MCP_CONFIG |
| Shipped | v0.3.43 (2026-07-04) |
| Scanner | agent_audit_kit/scanners/mcp_auth_pathtraversal.py |
| CWE | CWE-22 (Path Traversal) |
| OWASP MCP | MCP07:2025 (Insufficient Authentication & Authorization) |
| OWASP Agentic | ASI03 (Identity and Privilege Abuse) |
| AICM | IAM-01, IVS-04 |
| CVE | CVE-2026-52830 (CVSS 9.4) |
What it catches
MCP server authentication code that concatenates or os.path.join-es an
untrusted token / bearer credential into a filesystem path used for a
session existence / read check, without rejecting path separators / ..
or resolving-and-containing the result.
Because the caller controls the token, they control the path. A token value
like ../../etc/passwd or ../<another-user-session> escapes the intended
session directory — turning what looks like an auth check into arbitrary-file
access and cross-session takeover.
CVE-2026-52830 (fast-mcp-telegram < 0.19.1, CVSS 9.4) is the canonical
example: the server joined the caller-supplied bearer token straight into the
session file path used to test whether a session existed, so a crafted token
traversed out of the session directory. Fixed in 0.19.1.
Detection
Python is analysed with the stdlib ast taint mechanism the repo already uses
(no new engine — the tree-sitter work under issue #22 was a TypeScript slice and is closed). Per function:
- Source — a value read from a request header / bearer extraction
(
request.headers.get("Authorization"),headers["authorization"]), or a parameter whose name looks like a token/credential (token,bearer,auth,credential,api_key,session_id). - Flow into a path — that tainted value reaches
os.path.join(...),Path(...) / token,pathlibdivision, or an f-string /+concatenation that builds a path-like string. - Sink — the constructed path reaches
os.path.exists/os.path.isfile/open/Path.exists/Path.is_file/Path.open/os.stat. - Suppressed when the same function normalizes / rejects: a separator or
..check on the token,os.path.normpath/realpath/abspath+startswithcontainment,Path.resolve()+is_relative_to/relative_to, orwerkzeug.utils.secure_filename.
TS/JS/Rust servers use the analogous comment-stripped regex: a request-token
value concatenated (path.join / template literal / format! / PathBuf)
into a path with an existsSync / open / read sink and no separator /
normalize guard.
What it does NOT catch
- Cross-function flow where the token is extracted in one helper and the path
built in another — detection is within a single function body. Consolidate,
or, if the cross-function design has its own reject-and-contain guard, list
the file under
ignore-pathsin.agent-audit-kit.yml. AAK reads no per-line suppression comment. - A resource-handler traversal on a request path parameter (that is
AAK-MCP-015) — this rule is specifically the auth-token-as-filename case.
Vulnerable
def load_session(request):
token = request.headers.get("Authorization").removeprefix("Bearer ")
session_path = os.path.join(SESSION_DIR, token + ".session") # token controls the path
if os.path.exists(session_path): # traversal reaches the fs
return open(session_path).read()
Remediation
Reject separators and .., then resolve-and-contain:
def load_session(request):
token = request.headers.get("Authorization").removeprefix("Bearer ")
if "/" in token or "\\" in token or ".." in token:
raise ValueError("invalid token")
session_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(SESSION_DIR, token + ".session"))
if not session_path.startswith(SESSION_DIR + os.sep):
raise ValueError("path traversal")
if os.path.exists(session_path):
return open(session_path).read()
- Prefer a hashed / opaque session id over the raw token as a filename.
- Upgrade
fast-mcp-telegramto >= 0.19.1.
References
Registry reference
This section is generated from the rule registry (agent_audit_kit/rules/builtin.py) when the documentation is built, so it follows the scanner. The rest of the page is hand-written; where the two disagree, the registry is what runs.
- Severity
- CRITICAL
- Category
- MCP Configuration (
mcp-config) - Scanner
agent_audit_kit/scanners/mcp_auth_pathtraversal.py- Auto-fixable
- No.
- SARIF name
McpAuthPathTraversal
What it detects
MCP server authentication code concatenates or os.path.join-es an untrusted token / bearer credential into a filesystem path that is then used for a session existence / read check, without rejecting path separators / .. or resolving-and-containing the result. Because the caller controls the token, they control the path: a value like ../../etc/passwd or ../<another-user-session> escapes the intended session directory, turning an auth check into arbitrary-file access and cross-session takeover. Anchor: CVE-2026-52830 (CVSS 9.4, CWE-22 Path Traversal) — fast-mcp-telegram before 0.19.1 joined the caller-supplied bearer token straight into the session file path used to test whether a session existed, so a crafted token traversed out of the session directory; fixed in 0.19.1. The Python detector is a stdlib-ast taint flow (token source -> path construction -> exists/open sink, suppressed by a separator/.. reject or a resolve-and-contain guard); TS/JS/Rust use the analogous concat-into-path regex. Distinct from AAK-MCP-015 (a resource-handler path traversal on a request path parameter) — here the tainted source is the auth token itself.
How to fix
Reject path separators and .. in the token before it touches the filesystem; resolve the constructed session path (os.path.realpath / Path.resolve()) and verify it is inside the intended session directory (startswith / Path.is_relative_to) before use; prefer a hashed / opaque session id over the raw token as a filename. Upgrade fast-mcp-telegram to >= 0.19.1.
To confirm the finding is gone, report only this rule:
agent-audit-kit scan . --rules AAK-MCP-AUTH-PATHTRAVERSAL-001
Limitations
In Python it treats any of secure_filename, is_relative_to, relative_to, normpath, realpath, abspath, os.sep, sep, commonpath, commonprefix, .., startswith, resolve( or a split("/" (any case, so startsWith counts) in the same function as a guard against traversal; in TypeScript, JavaScript and Rust files it is anywhere in the file. The startswith("Bearer ") that extracts the token is enough to silence it, though it checks nothing about the path.
References (registry)
- CVE: CVE-2026-52830
- OWASP MCP Top 10: MCP07:2025 (Insufficient Authentication & Authorization)
- OWASP Agentic Top 10: ASI03 (Identity and Privilege Abuse)
- Adversa AI MCP Top 25 (AAK-defined ids): ADV-RES-01
- CSA AI Controls Matrix (AICM): IAM-01, IVS-04