AAK-MCP-CARD-003: MCP server card missing or invalid signature / provenance
- Severity
- HIGH
- Category
- MCP Server Card (
mcp-server-card) - Scanner
agent_audit_kit/scanners/mcp_server_card.py- Auto-fixable
- No.
- SARIF name
McpCardUnsignedProvenance
What it detects
A SEP-1649 server card carries no signature / provenance / attestation / publisher field, or one that is empty / a placeholder. The card's self-declared tool list, transport, and endpoint are then trusted with no proof of origin — a MITM or a typosquatting host can serve a forged card at the well-known path and the client will provision against it.
How to fix
Sign the server card (detached signature or an attestation block) and have clients verify it against a pinned publisher key before provisioning. Populate publisher / provenance with a verifiable identity — never a placeholder.
To confirm the finding is gone, report only this rule:
agent-audit-kit scan . --rules AAK-MCP-CARD-003
Limitations
Checks that a signature, signatures, provenance, attestation, publisher or verified field exists and is not empty or a placeholder (todo, unsigned, xxx and the like). It never verifies a signature, so "signature": "not-a-real-signature" or "verified": true satisfies it.
References
- OWASP MCP Top 10: MCP03:2025 (Tool Poisoning), MCP04:2025 (Software Supply Chain Attacks & Dependency Tampering)
- OWASP Agentic Top 10: ASI04 (Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities)
- Adversa AI MCP Top 25 (AAK-defined ids): ADV-SUPPLY-08 (MCP-Specific Vuln)
All rules. This page is generated from the rule registry when the documentation is built; to change it, change the rule in agent_audit_kit/rules/builtin.py. To give the rule a hand-written write-up, add docs/rules/AAK-MCP-CARD-003.md: the page then shows that text, with the registry reference appended under it.