Skip to content

AAK-MCP-MARKETPLACE-CONFIG-FETCH-001

MCP server config fetched from a marketplace URL and spawned

Field Value
Severity CRITICAL
Category SUPPLY_CHAIN
Shipped v0.3.6 (2026-04-26)
Scanner agent_audit_kit/scanners/mcp_marketplace_fetch.py
CWE CWE-829 + CWE-78
OWASP MCP MCP04:2025 (Software Supply Chain Attacks & Dependency Tampering); MCP05:2025 (Command Injection & Execution)
OWASP Agentic ASI04 (Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities); ASI05 (Unexpected Code Execution (RCE))
AICM AIS-08, STA-02
Incidents OX-MCP-2026-04-25, CLOUDFLARE-MCP-DEFENDER-2026-04-25

What it catches

A function fetches a remote URL (requests.get, httpx.get, urllib.request.urlopen, fetch) and pipes the JSON / text return value into StdioServerParameters(...) / new StdioClientTransport({...}) in the same function or one frame deep.

Cloudflare's MCP-defender reframe (2026-04-25) called this out as the highest-risk single-line bug in the wild. A marketplace compromise becomes client-side RCE on every consumer at the next refresh.

Detection

Python AST:

  1. For each function, collect calls sorted by source line.
  2. First fetch-call (requests/httpx/urllib/urlopen) sets a fetch_seen flag and captures the URL constant if any.
  3. A subsequent StdioServerParameters / StdioClientTransport call in the same function fires the rule.

TypeScript: regex pass for await fetch(...) followed within 2KB by new Stdio*Transport.

Suppression

Add to .aak-mcp-marketplace-trust.yml:

trust:
  - url: "https://internal-registry.corp.example/mcp/manifest"
    justification: "Internal artifact registry; signatures verified separately."

Trust entries without a non-empty justification: do not suppress.

Remediation

Cache the response, sign it, verify the signature on load, and pin command to a constant binary path regardless of what the manifest says:

def load_pinned() -> StdioServerParameters:
    return StdioServerParameters(command="/usr/bin/server-a", args=[])

Registry reference

This section is generated from the rule registry (agent_audit_kit/rules/builtin.py) when the documentation is built, so it follows the scanner. The rest of the page is hand-written; where the two disagree, the registry is what runs.

Severity
CRITICAL
Category
Supply Chain (supply-chain)
Scanner
agent_audit_kit/scanners/mcp_marketplace_fetch.py
Auto-fixable
No.
SARIF name
McpMarketplaceConfigFetch

What it detects

A function fetches a remote URL (requests.get / httpx.get / urllib.request.urlopen / fetch) and pipes the JSON / text return value into StdioServerParameters(...) or new StdioClientTransport({...}) in the same function or one frame deep. The OX MCP April-2026 disclosure plus Cloudflare's MCP-defender reframe both call this out as the canonical supply-chain inversion: a marketplace compromise becomes client-side RCE on every consumer at the next refresh. Suppress with an entry in .aak-mcp-marketplace-trust.yml.

How to fix

Never feed a fetched marketplace manifest directly into StdioServerParameters. Cache the response, sign it, verify the signature on load, and pin command to a constant binary path regardless of what the manifest says. If the manifest URL is trusted (e.g. an internal artifact registry), add it to .aak-mcp-marketplace-trust.yml with a justification: field.

To confirm the finding is gone, report only this rule:

agent-audit-kit scan . --rules AAK-MCP-MARKETPLACE-CONFIG-FETCH-001

Limitations

Python: reports a get, post, request or urlopen call on requests, httpx or urllib (or a bare urlopen) followed, in the same function, by a StdioServerParameters or StdioClientTransport call, without checking that the fetched value reaches it. A request made through a session object (session = requests.Session(); session.get(url)) or in a different function is not seen. TypeScript: needs await fetch( within 2 KB before a new Stdio*Transport, so axios.get and fetch(...).then(...) are not matched. A source file over 512 KB, or a trust file over 1 MB, is not read.

References

  • OWASP MCP Top 10: MCP04:2025 (Software Supply Chain Attacks & Dependency Tampering), MCP05:2025 (Command Injection & Execution)
  • OWASP Agentic Top 10: ASI04 (Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities), ASI05 (Unexpected Code Execution (RCE))
  • Adversa AI MCP Top 25 (AAK-defined ids): ADV-SUPPLY-03 (Unpinned MCP Package)
  • Incidents and advisories: OX-MCP-2026-04-25, CLOUDFLARE-MCP-DEFENDER-2026-04-25
  • CSA AI Controls Matrix (AICM): AIS-08, STA-02

All rules.