AAK-MCP-SSRF-001: MCP tool handler fetches a caller-supplied URL without host/scheme allow-list
- Severity
- MEDIUM
- Category
- MCP Configuration (
mcp-config) - Scanner
agent_audit_kit/scanners/mcp_ssrf_toolarg.py- Auto-fixable
- No.
- SARIF name
McpToolArgUrlSsrf
What it detects
An MCP tool handler passes an attacker-controllable URL argument (url / endpoint / target / uri and similar) straight into an outbound fetch (requests / httpx / urllib / aiohttp) without validating the host or scheme first, so a caller-supplied URL is fetched server-side and can reach loopback, private-range, or cloud-metadata endpoints (CWE-918, server-side request forgery). NVD, CVE-2026-14748: "A flaw has been found in AIAnytime Awesome-MCP-Server ... the file mcp-wiki/src/mcp_wiki/server.py of the component mcp-wiki/wiki-summary. This manipulation of the argument url causes server-side request forgery. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been published." (CVSS 6.3 MEDIUM, https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-14748).
How to fix
Deny by default: before fetching, parse the URL, require an https scheme, resolve the host, and reject anything not on an explicit host allow-list (also reject RFC 1918, 127.0.0.0/8, 169.254.0.0/16, ::1, fc00::/7). Disable automatic redirects or re-validate every hop, and pin the resolved IP for the actual request to defeat DNS rebinding.
To confirm the finding is gone, report only this rule:
agent-audit-kit scan . --rules AAK-MCP-SSRF-001
Limitations
Reads only files that contain FastMCP, McpServer, modelcontextprotocol, createTool, mcp.tool, @tool, @x.tool, .tool(, .registerTool, from mcp, import mcp (each as whole words), mcp.server or mcp_wiki (any case). In Python, a parameter counts as a URL when its name is url, uri, endpoint, target, link, href, webhook or callback, with an optional plural s and one optional alphanumeric prefix joined by an underscore, in any case (page_url, v2_url), so website is not followed. The fetch has to be in the same function, so a handler that passes url to a helper which calls requests.get is missed, and any of ALLOW_HOST(S), ALLOWED_HOST(S), allowlist, allow_list, urlparse, is_private, ip_address, ip_network, validate_url, is_safe_url, check_url, ssrf, deny, scheme [not] in, netloc [not] in, hostname [not] in or startswith("https in the function, in any case, counts as validation, even when its result is only logged.
References
- CVE: CVE-2026-14748, CVE-2026-104120
- OWASP MCP Top 10: MCP05:2025 (Command Injection & Execution)
- OWASP Agentic Top 10: ASI02 (Tool Misuse and Exploitation)
- Adversa AI MCP Top 25 (AAK-defined ids): ADV-SSRF-01 (Internal Network MCP)
- CSA AI Controls Matrix (AICM): IVS-04, AIS-08
All rules. This page is generated from the rule registry when the documentation is built; to change it, change the rule in agent_audit_kit/rules/builtin.py. To give the rule a hand-written write-up, add docs/rules/AAK-MCP-SSRF-001.md: the page then shows that text, with the registry reference appended under it.