AAK-SHELL-QUOTED-INTERP-001: Tool argument interpolated into a shell command, quoting notwithstanding
- Severity
- HIGH
- Category
- Taint Analysis (
taint-analysis) - Scanner
agent_audit_kit/scanners/quoted_shell_interp.py- Auto-fixable
- No.
- SARIF name
ShellQuotedInterpolation
What it detects
An agent/tool parameter reaches a shell-executing sink through an interpolated command string (CWE-78), including via a local variable and including when the interpolation site is quoted. Double quotes are not a mitigation: $(...), backticks and ${...} all expand inside them, so getent passwd "${username}" is exactly as injectable as the unquoted form — that is CVE-2026-55157 (CVSS 3.1 8.4). Single quotes do block substitution but not a literal ' that closes the quoting. The rule also covers the argv-behind-an-eval-flag form: passing a list instead of a shell string stops shell metacharacters, but not injection into an interpreter you explicitly invoked, which is how CVE-2026-55071 (CVSS 3.1 8.4) reached the OS through Stata's own shell escape. In JavaScript and TypeScript it also follows one call into another file: a tool handler passes a tool-argument value to a method defined in another file, and that method interpolates the parameter into the command. That is CVE-2026-94031, where nexus-mcp's nexus_reauth handler handed its url argument to a method that ran open "${loginUrl}" through exec. Narrower and more precise than AAK-TAINT-001, which only matches a bare parameter handed straight to the sink.
How to fix
Do not build the command as a string. Pass an argv list with no shell, and if an element must carry a value, escape it with shlex.quote (Python) or the shell-quote package (Node). Where the argv element is itself a program for an interpreter, validate the value against an allow-list — quoting the outer shell does nothing for the inner one.
To confirm the finding is gone, report only this rule:
agent-audit-kit scan . --rules AAK-SHELL-QUOTED-INTERP-001
Limitations
Propagation is one hop: a parameter interpolated into a local variable that is then passed to the sink. In JavaScript and TypeScript it also follows one call from a tool handler into a method defined in another file, matched by name, not type: a same-named method elsewhere can be matched, and a value routed through two helpers is not followed. Python does not follow calls into other modules.
References
- CVE: CVE-2026-55157, CVE-2026-55071, CVE-2026-94031
- OWASP MCP Top 10: MCP05:2025 (Command Injection & Execution)
- OWASP Agentic Top 10: ASI05 (Unexpected Code Execution (RCE))
- Adversa AI MCP Top 25 (AAK-defined ids): ADV-TOOL-02
- Incidents and advisories: GHSA-49mq-fc6q-3h46, GHSA-49m4-vp58-wgc9
All rules. This page is generated from the rule registry when the documentation is built; to change it, change the rule in agent_audit_kit/rules/builtin.py. To give the rule a hand-written write-up, add docs/rules/AAK-SHELL-QUOTED-INTERP-001.md: the page then shows that text, with the registry reference appended under it.