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AAK-SKILL-UNTRUSTED-EXEC-PATH: Untrusted-search-path executable override in skill/install flow

Severity
HIGH
Category
Supply Chain (supply-chain)
Scanner
agent_audit_kit/scanners/skill_untrusted_exec_path.py
Auto-fixable
No.
SARIF name
SkillUntrustedExecPath

What it detects

Install or skill-setup code resolves an executable, interpreter, or build tool from a workspace-controlled source and runs it without an absolute-path pin or allowlist, so the workspace decides which binary executes. Detected sources: a .env / dotenv-sourced variable (load_dotenv() then os.environ.get(...) / os.getenv(...) / dotenv_values(...)), a PATH prepended with a non-absolute / workspace directory (os.environ['PATH'] = os.getcwd() + os.pathsep + ...), shutil.which(...) resolved over such a tainted PATH, or a Homebrew / package-manager binary chosen via an env override (HOMEBREW_* / BREW). Anchor: CVE-2026-53819 (CWE-426 Untrusted Search Path, CVSS 8.7) — OpenClaw before 2026.5.27 let a workspace .env override the Homebrew executable selection during skill install, executing unintended Homebrew-compatible binaries to compromise the system. This is an install-time code-execution sink, distinct from AAK-CLAUDE-WIN-001 (a Windows ProgramData config-path hijack) and from the AAK-SKILL-001..005 SKILL.md content checks.

How to fix

Pin the executable to an absolute path; do not resolve build tools from workspace-controlled env. Hard-code the trusted binary location (e.g. /opt/homebrew/bin/brew) or validate the resolved path against an allowlist with os.path.isabs before exec, and never let a workspace .env or a workspace-relative PATH prepend select the interpreter / build tool used during skill setup.

To confirm the finding is gone, report only this rule:

agent-audit-kit scan . --rules AAK-SKILL-UNTRUSTED-EXEC-PATH

Limitations

Reads .py, .sh and .bash files whose name or content looks like install or skill-setup code. In Python the sinks are subprocess.run, call, check_call, check_output, getoutput, getstatusoutput, a lowercase popen and the os.system, os.popen, os.exec* and os.spawn* calls, so subprocess.Popen([brew, ...]) and asyncio.create_subprocess_exec are not reported. A mention of os.path.isabs, an allowlist or ALLOWED_BINARIES anywhere in the file clears it, whatever it guards, and an install script written in JavaScript is not read.

References


All rules. This page is generated from the rule registry when the documentation is built; to change it, change the rule in agent_audit_kit/rules/builtin.py. To give the rule a hand-written write-up, add docs/rules/AAK-SKILL-UNTRUSTED-EXEC-PATH.md: the page then shows that text, with the registry reference appended under it.