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AAK-MCP-STDIO-CMD-INJ-001

MCP StdioServerParameters built from network-controlled input (Python)

Field Value
Severity CRITICAL
Category SUPPLY_CHAIN
Shipped v0.3.6 (2026-04-26)
Scanner agent_audit_kit/scanners/mcp_stdio_params.py
CWE CWE-78 + CWE-77
OWASP MCP MCP05:2025 (Command Injection & Execution)
OWASP Agentic ASI05 (Unexpected Code Execution (RCE))
AICM AIS-08, IAM-05
CVEs CVE-2026-30615, 30617, 30623, 22252, 22688, 33224, 40933, 6980
Incident OX-MCP-2026-04-25

What it catches

A Python function calls StdioServerParameters(command=..., args=...) from mcp.client.stdio / modelcontextprotocol.client while also reading from a network-controlled source (request.json(), flask.request.*, fastapi.Request.*, os.environ[<var>], json.loads(<network>), yaml.safe_load(<network>)). The OX MCP April-2026 disclosure aggregated 8 CVEs to this exact shape: the SDK executes whatever ends up in command/args verbatim.

This rule is the SDK-named-API config-side counterpart to AAK-STDIO-001 (see the per-rule index), which detects the broader subprocess(shell=True) sink shape. Both fire on overlapping inputs; do not collapse them.

Detection

The Python pass walks the AST and orders calls by source line so StdioServerParameters invoked after a tainted source is detected even when the validator and call are nested at different AST depths. Per function:

  1. Collect every Call node, sort by (lineno, col_offset).
  2. For each call, check if _attr_chain(call.func) ends in StdioServerParameters.
  3. Scan the enclosing function source for any of: request.(json|form|args|data|values|headers|files), flask.request.*, fastapi.Request.*, requests.<verb>(...).json(), httpx.<verb>(...).json(), urllib.request.urlopen(, os.environ, json.loads, yaml.safe_load, yaml.load.
  4. If no marker fires, accept the cross-frame hint: function arg named body / payload / req / request / event / data / config.

Remediation

Pin command to a constant binary path. Look up server choice in a server-side allow-list keyed by tenant identity, never by a free-form string in the request:

ALLOWED_BINARIES = {"server-a": "/usr/bin/server-a", "server-b": "/usr/bin/server-b"}

def spawn(name: str) -> StdioServerParameters:
    if name not in ALLOWED_BINARIES:
        raise ValueError("not allowed")
    return StdioServerParameters(command=ALLOWED_BINARIES[name], args=[])

Sister rules


Registry reference

This section is generated from the rule registry (agent_audit_kit/rules/builtin.py) when the documentation is built, so it follows the scanner. The rest of the page is hand-written; where the two disagree, the registry is what runs.

Severity
CRITICAL
Category
Supply Chain (supply-chain)
Scanner
agent_audit_kit/scanners/mcp_stdio_params.py
Auto-fixable
No.
SARIF name
McpStdioServerParamsTainted

What it detects

A Python function calls StdioServerParameters(command=..., args=...) from mcp.client.stdio / modelcontextprotocol.client while also reading from a network-controlled source (request body, fetched JSON, environment variable wired to a webhook, untrusted YAML). The OX MCP April-2026 architectural class makes this exploitable: the SDK executes whatever ends up in command/args verbatim. The same class without the SDK is a hand-rolled launcher: subprocess.Popen, subprocess.run or asyncio.create_subprocess_exec over shlex.split() of a stored server record's command field (server.endpoint_or_command, cfg["command"]), in a class or function that manages MCP STDIO servers, with no executable allowlist between the split and the spawn. A command users register over an application's API is as network-controlled as a request body (CVE-2026-93965, SxDevOps). Both arms are AST within one function, not data flow across functions. See AAK-STDIO-001 for the broader sink-pattern detector; this rule is the launcher-side counterpart.

How to fix

Never build StdioServerParameters.command / .args, or the argv a launcher splits, from a network-controlled value. Pin command to a constant binary path and validate args against an allow-list. If a tenant must pick the server, look the choice up in a server-side allow-list keyed by tenant identity, not by a free-form string in the request. An application that stores user-registered STDIO servers must check the executable, and for npx or uvx the package, against an allowlist before spawning, reject shell metacharacters, and drop PATH / LD_PRELOAD-style keys from the server's environment.

To confirm the finding is gone, report only this rule:

agent-audit-kit scan . --rules AAK-MCP-STDIO-CMD-INJ-001

Limitations

Reads one function at a time. A StdioServerParameters(command=, args=) call counts as tainted when its command or args come straight from a request, HTTP-client, os.environ, json.loads or yaml.load expression, from a parameter named body, payload, req, request, event, untrusted or user_input, or from a local assigned from such an expression. A value that arrives through any other parameter name (def build(spec) called with request.json()), through a helper's return value or through an attribute stored on self is not followed. A source file over 512 KB is not read.

References


All rules.